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One of the most critical issue in M&A operations is the acquisition premium. This quantity is 
usually expressed as a percentage value. 
This thesis explains how the acquisition premium is usually represented by business analysts 
and academic literature. We highlight advantages and limits of this common premium measure. 
The purpose of our analysis is to prove the intuition of academics that the pre-deal leverage of 
the target company may overstate the dimension of percentage acquisition premium. We also 
analysed possible adjustment methods to correct this effect for the purpose of business 
valuation. 
This document is organized in four main chapters. The first chapter introduces the main 
concepts on the issue and the theoretical framework of reference. It illustrates how the value 
created in M&A operations is represented, how values are computed and the link between value 
and acquisition premium. The second chapter contains a theoretical analysis on the 
representation of acquisition premium and its relationship with leverage through an intense 
academic literature review. It illustrates different studies on premiums and how these studies 
reported them. Moreover, we provide the reader with theoretical examples to understand the 
effect of pre-deal leverage and we report the results of an important academic research on this 
issue. The third chapter represents the core of this thesis and contains an empirical analysis to 
verify our hypothesis. We used statistical and econometric tools to understand the relationship 
of pre-deal leverage and acquisition premium in the EU M&A market. Further, we investigate 
possible alternative solutions to express premiums. The fourth and last chapter provide the 
reader with an adjustment method suitable for the EU M&A market. Additionally, we illustrate 




VALUE CREATION IN M&A 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The shareholder value approach says the ultimate objective of the enterprise’s managers must 
be the maximization of shareholder’s equity value. This principle should push managers to 
increase the overall enterprise’s value. Among all the viable options, mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) are the most important strategic tools which enhance value through inorganic growth 
of an enterprise (Manelli & Pace, 2009). 
M&A are complex events in business life. They quickly reallocate a huge amount of resources 
among entities and people involved. From a general point of view, a merger combines different 
companies in a unique economic and legal entity, while an acquisition is a purchase of an entity 
(target) by another. In both cases, the transfer of a controlling interest ownership from the seller 
to the acquirer takes place in exchange of a price (DePamphilis, 2014). The interest acquired 
allows the new owner to exert control over the target. Hence, this kind of transactions give rise 
to a deep change in the ownership structure and stewardship of the acquired entity. 
The main actors of these events are the seller and the acquirer of the target, namely the 
shareholders of the subject enterprise. However, M&A involve many professionals and other 
entities. Each of these has got a specific role and various tasks throughout the process. They are 
the top management of the target and the acquirer, corporate lawyers, accountants, investment 
banks and public authorities. 
The process is formed by several steps and requires different documents for each phase. Even 
if it can vary widely depending on the tendency of the transaction (hostile or friendly), it always 
starts with a strategical phase. After this first step, there is the core of the process, which goes 
from the screening of potential targets to the valuation of the ones most fitting the acquirer’s 
selection criteria. The transaction legally ends with the negotiation and deal closing phase. 
However, the last phase of integration plays one of the most critical role. This ultimate step 
allows the acquirer to realize all the planned improvements and synergies, therefore obtaining 
the supposed incremental value creation. 
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All M&A transactions have many common elements, but each specific deal is unique to a 
certain extent, especially from the point of view of synergies (Kengelbach, et al., 2013). As 
consequence, a high level of attention must be paid when analyses of these operations are 
performed. This is especially true, when analysts utilize as reference, data from a group of peers, 
to make comparisons. 
 
1.2 Value Creation Framework 
As value creator tools, M&A operations must be analysed carefully to verify their potential to 
generate new value. The value creation framework helps to figure out whether a M&A 
operation creates value and to whom this value goes from a quantitative point of view. The 
scheme compares acquirer and seller sides of the transaction, respectively represented by the 
left and the right columns illustrated in chart 1. 
 
Chart 1 - Acquisition Evaluation Framework 
 
Source: Koller et al., 2015 with adaptation 
 
The overall value received by the acquirer can be seen as the sum of the stand-alone value of 
the target under the stewardship of the current management and the incremental value that 
would be generated after the transaction. Hence, the difference between the value received by 
the acquirer and the price paid by the acquirer is the value created for the acquirer. 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 − 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 
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Whereas, the value received by the seller is the price paid by the acquirer. Consequently, the 
difference between the price paid and the market value of the target is the new value created for 
the seller also called acquisition premium. 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 = 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑉𝑉 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 
 
Obviously, the greater the acquisition premium the lower will be the value created for the 
acquirer and vice-versa (Koller, et al., 2015). 
A common use of the framework is to help the acquirer and the seller to visualize the offer price 
range. The upper bound of the range should be the value received by the acquirer. If the acquirer 
pays a greater price than the maximum value he would receive, he wastes value. In particular, 
if he pays exactly the upper bound amount, all the value created flows into the pocket of the 
seller. Further, he should take into account the risk that, the incremental value he is going to 
pay, would never realize. On the other side, the lower bound of the range is the market value of 
the target. Note that, in normal circumstances the seller would never sell the entity for this 
value, but he will ask always for a premium. Hence, one of the reasons the acquirer is willing 
to pay a premium is to push the current owner to sell its interest (DePamphilis, 2014). 
Because of this reasoning, the price offered should lay in the middle between the maximum bid 
the acquirer is willing to pay and the minimum bid the seller is willing to accept. However, the 
final price paid is always matter of negotiation and bargaining powers, which strongly influence 
the outcome of each M&A transaction. 
 
1.3 The Difference between Price Paid and Value 
A famous sentence and a strong principle in business valuation practice is: “price is what you 
pay, value is what you get”. This statement highlights the fact that prices formed on markets 
may differ widely from interests’ valuations. Fundamental analysis is a practice based on the 
idea that enterprise shares have an intrinsic value and prices tend to converge toward it in the 
middle-long run. However, the idea that interests have an inherent value is elusive because 
value is always a relative concept (Penman, 2011). 
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In other words, prices are expression of supply and demand forces within the market place, 
hence they represent objective data. While, valuations are subjective estimates made by 
appraisers for specific purposes, sometimes very different among them, using vary 
methodologies and information (Guatri & Bini, 2005).  
The first reason for Guatri & Bini of these discrepancies is the influence of some factors after 
the valuation process. These factors can be internal and/or external to the enterprise. Regarding 
external factors, these are mainly related to financial capital markets, which can vary by their 
level of efficiency. In general, a highly efficient financial market has the tendency to reflect 
rapidly and consistently the fundamental value variations in the negotiated prices. For what 
concern internal factors, the authors found the ability of “communicating value” to be the key 
element through which the enterprise can reduce the gap between price and value. This ability 
is enhanced by the transparency and effectiveness of communication and by the strategical and 
financial credibility of the enterprise. 
The second reason stated which can explain these discrepancies is related to the object 
exchanged. Interests with different features like control power or marketability show different 
prices and different values. 
An important consideration about limits to empirical analysis on these discrepancies has to be 
made. There is a big difference between data available for listed companies and unlisted 
companies. For listed companies, shares are frequently traded on stock exchanges and valuation 
reports are periodically issued by financial analysts. Note that these prices are referred to 
marketable minority shares. Moreover, transactions involving the exchange of majority 
interests are not so common. Otherwise, for unlisted companies, data like valuations and prices 
are hard to obtain for two main reasons. The first is that exchanges of majority and especially 
for minority interests are far less frequent than listed companies. While the second reason is 
that unlisted companies have a much less stringent legislation about public information, hence 
it is not easy to obtain private valuations and prices of interests exchanged for these companies 
(Appraisal Practices Board, 2015). 
 
1.4 Stand-Alone Value of the Target 
Bearing in mind the value creation framework, the starting point to figure the possible offer 
price out is the stand-alone value of the target. It represents the value of the target lead by the 
current management in normal on going circumstances. To quantify this value there are various 
valuation methods. The two main categories are the absolute and the relative valuation 
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methodologies. The most common in business practice for the first category is the discounted 
future cash flows model (DCF), while for the second category we referred to comparable 
multiples methods. 
The DCF method is based on the forecasted future cash flows that the business generates during 
its entire life. Once estimated, the projections are discounted back to the present value at a given 
rate of return also called cost of capital. The DCF valuation process is divided in two parts. The 
first part of the process is to value the cash flows that have been specifically forecasted for a 
period of 3 or 5 years usually. While, the second part considers the rest of the cash flows as a 
perpetuity called terminal or continuing value. In particular, the perpetuity can represent the 
value of a stable stream of cash flows or a growing stream of cash flows. The enterprise value 
is the sum of the present value of the first part plus the present value of the second part. This 
value is the result of the discounted cash flows arising from the operating assets of the entity. 
Hence, the enterprise value is owed to debtholders and shareholders. To obtain the equity value, 
so the value of the target, the last step is to deduct the value of liabilities from the enterprise 
value (Gaughan, 2015). 
The comparable multiples methods are quick and easy to value a target enterprise and their use 
is increasing through time and space. The comparable multiples methods can be applied to: 
• Comparable companies 
• Comparable transactions 
Even if they could seem very similar, indeed they are very different. The first one uses a group 
of listed peers and prices formed on financial markets from which financial analysts compute 
multiples to be applied to the target data. Whereas, the second one involves only transactions 
like M&A where a controlling interest of peer companies is exchanged. 
In both approaches, to build a careful multiples analysis there are three guidelines to respect: 
1) Use the correct multiple 
2) Calculate the multiple in a consistent manner 
3) Use the right peer group 
In business valuation practice multiples are divided in two categories: equity side and asset side. 
The most common multiples used are the price to earnings ratio, the enterprise value to 
EBITDA ratio, the price to book ratio and the price to revenues ratio. Particularly important is 
to compute the multiple in a consistent way, so the numerator and the denominator must be 
based on the same underlying assets. With respect to comparability, a good point to start is to 
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define peers within the same industry. Moreover, to select the right enterprises in the industry, 
it is useful to look for similar long-term growth and returns prospects (Guatri & Bini, 2005). 
A difference to be pointed out between the absolute and relative valuation methods is about the 
final outcomes. With the first method, the outcome is the value of the whole equity of the 
evaluated entity. Whereas with the second method, the result obtained is usually a per share 
value, which is then multiplied by the outstanding shares to reach the whole equity value. At 
the end, both methods provide a number expressed in a defined currency term which is the 
valuation of the target enterprise. 
 
1.4.1 Levels of Value 
The outcome of valuation methodologies depends on the characteristics of the object being 
valued. Precisely, two features which mostly influence the valuation process and the results are 
whether the target is listed on a financial market and the percentage of equity interest 
exchanged. The first feature expresses the fact that when an enterprise is listed, its shares are 
traded on stock exchanges. While the second feature expresses the fact that the interest 
exchanged can be whichever quantity between a thin fraction of the equity and the whole 
amount of it. Both these characteristics do influence the degree of control over the enterprise 
and the degree of marketability/liquidity of the specific interest exchanged. 
The degree of control over an enterprise is directly related to the percentage of equity interest 
owned because of the governance rules to appoint the board of directors. Note that to gain the 
control, so the power to govern the enterprise at will, it is not needed to purchase the 100% of 
the outstanding shares. Not even a stake greater than 50% is indispensable. The acquirer can 
purchase less shares and still owns control in particular situations. There are numerous legal 
tools and practical conditions that can allow to control the enterprise without the majority of 
the outstanding shares. For instance, voting rights can be differentiated among different 
shareholders classes  or  when the remaining part of shares are highly spread among investors 
(Mellen & Evans, 2010). A quasi comprehensive illustration of the levels of ownership and 
their relations with control is represented in chart 2. 
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Chart 2 - Levels of Ownership 
 
Source: Hitchner J.R., 2011 - Adaptation 
 
With respect to the degree of marketability and liquidity a preliminary remark should be made. 
Liquidity and marketability are two different features of an interest. Liquidity is the possibility 
to quickly sell a share without a relevant economic decrease of value whereas marketability is 
the right to sell it. However, these terms are often used interchangeably in business valuation 
practice. Furthermore, there is a strong link between liquidity and marketability because the 
former always implies the latter but the reserve is not true (Hitchner, 2011). The degree of these 
two characteristics differ from controlling interests to non-controlling interests and from listed 
to unlisted enterprises shares. For instance, in normal circumstances, publicly traded shares are 
liquid, controlling interests in private companies are considered marketable but less liquid than 
the previous case and non-controlling interests in private companies are seen as almost 
nonmarketable because the low degree of liquidity (Pratt, 2009).  
To reflect different degree of control and different degree of marketability into valuation of 
various interests, appraisers have developed tools to adjust the outcome of valuation 
methodologies. These tools are premiums and discounts like the control premium and the 
discount for lack of marketability. They can be applied to increase or reduce the result of 
valuation processes to properly reflect interest features.  
Premiums and discounts can be also seen as links between different levels of value. Mercer is 
the first, who described and illustrated the levels of value and the relationships among them. 
This classification is a milestone in the business valuation practice and a useful reasoning tool. 
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The framework he developed is represented by a chart, but since there are contradictory 
opinions, this is continuously changing. Chart 3 provides the most recent illustration. 
 
Chart 3 - Levels of Value 
Source: Mercer C.Z. and Harms T.W., 2008 
 
Each level is related to an interest with different level of control and marketability. For Mercer, 
the marketable minority value is the base level of value to which the other levels must be 
referred and computed. It represents the value of a minority interest in a publicly traded 
enterprise. If we apply a discount for lack of marketability we would obtain the nonmarketable 
minority value. This is the value of a minority interest in a privately held enterprise not listed 
in a stock exchange. Otherwise if we apply a control premium we reach the financial control 
value also called control stand-alone value. This is the value of a controlling interest. Although 
this kind of interest is considered to have a high degree of marketability, it has been seen that 
selling this interest requires time and effort. The highest level of value is the synergistic or 
strategic value. This is due to the value that a strategic buyer might extract and pay in an M&A 
transaction to acquire control of the entity (Mercer & Harms, 2008). 
 
Strategic Control  
Value 
Financial Control  
Value 










Marketability    
Discount 
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1.4.2 Valuation Methods and Levels of Value 
As previously mentioned, the stand-alone value of the target is obtained through accounting 
and financial procedures which imply specific methods varying between absolute and relative 
valuation methodologies. However, each different method leads to a different level of value. 
Given this fact, it is fundamental to clearly know which is the level of value resulting from the 
selected method, to reach the desired interest valuation through the application of the adequate 
premiums or discounts at the end of the process (Mellen & Evans, 2010). 
Pratt explains that in some cases valuation methods provide a clear level of value, while in other 
cases there is a significant debate over the resultant level of value. Obviously, this confusion 
complicates the use of premiums and discounts. With respect to absolute valuation 
methodologies, each of these approaches can lead to every level of value.  
To understand the value obtained with a specific absolute method, the analyst should clearly 
know the assumptions underlying the model. The first assumption to specify is about the cash 
flows or earnings being discounted or capitalized. If these projections reflect streams that a 
control owner would expect to realize then a control premium is already embedded into the 
valuation. Vice-versa if the projections do not reflect streams that a control owner would expect 
to realize then to obtain a control level valuation, the use of a control premium may be 
recommended. The second assumption to specify about the model is the rate of return. Given 
the fact that the rates of return are obtained from market data of public companies, some analysts 
believe that absolute methods produce a marketable minority value. However, this is a 
misconception because, in the words of Pratt, “There is little or no difference in the rate of 
return that most investors require for investing in a public, freely tradable minority interest 
versus a controlling interest”. 
With respect to comparable multiples methods, the obtained level of value is different whether 
the analyst uses the comparable transactions approach or the comparable companies approach. 
With the first approach, multiples are computed from data based on transactions entailing 
ownership transfers of controlling interests. Hence, a control premium is already included in 
the price paid, because an interest which allows to control the enterprise is exchanged. With 
this approach, the resulting value is at control level. Starting from this valuation, to appraise a 
minority interest it will require a discount for lack of control. Whereas, the second approach 
uses prices of a peer group of publicly traded companies to obtain multiples.  Consequently, the 
value obtained by this approach reflects the way in which markets evaluate public companies 
shares. Usually on stock exchanges thin fractions of ownership are traded, then a marketable 
minority level of value is the obtained valuation (Pratt, 2009). 
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1.5 Managerial Improvements and Synergies 
The value received by the acquirer should coincide with the maximum amount the acquirer is 
willing to offer. This maximum value is composed by the stand-alone value of the target and 
the incremental value the acquirer thinks can extract from the deal. The incremental value is 
due to improvements achievable by the acquirer. These improvements are a critical issue 
because they are concrete determinants of the offered price. From this point of view, the 
acquisition premium can be seen as a function of the incremental value.  
A distinction to bear in mind is that the nature and the amount of the incremental value are 
different depending on the type of transaction. The possibilities are a transaction which implies 
only a change of the controlling owner and a transaction which implies a substantial 
combination of the two entities, no matter if the legal entites remain separated (DePamphilis, 
2014). 
In the first case, the acquirer only gains the control of the enterprise. It can be considered a 
financial investor, like private equity firms, and its objective is typically to identify companies 
with future growth opportunities and durable competitive advantages. Once an attractive target 
has been identified, the financial investor buys the shares to obtain the control. This is an equity 
investment and usually the investor realizes a return on it with a sale or an IPO in the future. It 
evaluates the target and base the offer price on the possibility to better manage its operations, 
financials and applying a better corporate governance. In the second case, two companies are 
combined together. The acquirer can be considered a strategic investor and its objective is to 
identify companies whose products or services can be synergistically integrated with its to 
create incremental long-term value for shareholders. They can be firms in related type of 
business, such as competitors, suppliers and even customers. For this second type of buyers the 
incremental value generable is not only due to a better management of the target but also to 
synergies between the target and the acquirer. For this reason, strategic buyers evaluate and can 
pay more for a target with respect to financial buyers (Malenko & Gorbenko, 2014). 
The incremental value which financial investors can obtain through the change of target 
stewardship is the value of control as proposed by Damodaran. He suggests to compute the 
expected incremental value as the product between the value arising from changes in the entity 
management and the probability these changes will occur. If we look at the target as a collection 
of operating assets only, we can consider the whole enterprise value as the present value of 
financial cash flows, so we have the following formula of value: 
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The incremental value of the enterprise can arise from an increase in cash flows, an increase in 
the expected growth, an extension of the period of high growth or a reduction in the cost of 
financing. Insights about the likelihood component are hard to figure out but this is influenced 
by management changing procedure, legal restrictions, inertia, conflict of interests and 
corporate charter amendments among the others (Damodaran, 2005). 
Further, for strategic buyers the surplus of value with respect to financial investors arise from 
synergies. These are indirectly defined as the value of the combined entity V(a+b) less the value 
of the two separated entities summed together VA + VT. 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸 = V(A+T) − (VA + VT) 
 
The total amount of synergies is the sum of operational synergies, financial synergies, fiscal 
synergies and market synergies less the costs to implement these synergies. The result is the 
value of net synergies which is another component of the incremental value in case of entities 
combination (Manelli & Pace, 2009). Even in this case the final value of synergies should be 
weight for the probability that these synergies will eventually arise. However, if the likelihood 
component of former managerial improvements were hard to figure out, this probability could 
be even harder to point out because of the greater complexity of the transaction. 
As a matter of notation, given the above definition of synergies, we must assume that the value 
of the target (VT) is already maximized as stand-alone and no other value of better management 
can be added. 
 
1.6 Private Benefits of Control 
Another way to increase value for controlling shareholders is to divert it from the non-
controlling shareholders to themselves. This way of increasing value is feasible only when a 
majority interest with control power does not represent 100% of equity. Moreover, the principle 
can be extended toward all relationships involving stakeholders of the enterprise.  
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The extracted value can be monetary or no-monetary and it is due to the control power that 
controlling shareholders have with respect to other shareholders. For instance, a no-monetary 
benefit is the “psychic” value that some shareholders simply attribute to being in control, though 
this hardly explains the premium paid for a controlling interest. Examples of monetary benefits 
shareholders can gain are the excess compensations and perquisites to particular related parties 
like relatives or even themselves as managers. Another possibility is to arrange favourable 
supply, demand or financing agreements with corporations related to the controlling owners. It 
is worth noting that, it is not forbidden to have transactions with related parties, but it is difficult 
to assess whether the conditions are “fair” with respect to the market.  This possibility of value 
transfer can eliminate or at least reduce the non-controlling returns (Hitchner, 2011). The 
private benefits extractions are associated with less developed financial markets and 
concentrated ownership. Moreover, these phenomena are highly widespread in countries where 
there is a lack of protection of non-controlling shareholders (Dyck & Zingales, 2004). These 
practices are referred as “tunnelling” and usually they are illegal. However, in the real world 
they happen and they are valuable in business transactions. Their effect is to increase the upper 
bound offer price range. They can be seen in higher premium paid for control when the buyer 
is resident in a country with lack of protection for non-controlling shareholders. The 
countermeasures against these extractions are: better accounting standards, better legal law 
enforcement, higher market competition, higher level of media transparency, more stringent 






The economic rationale of M&A transactions is the creation of new value for both entities 
shareholders. As stated in the previous chapter, when these events take place they entail the 
transfer of the controlling interest ownership from the seller to the acquirer in exchange of price. 
The core element of the change of ownership is the transfer of the enterprise control. A 
definition of control summarizes it as “the power to direct the management and policies of a 
business” (The International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms, 2010). In particular, who 
has control can exercise the so-called prerogatives of control. Pratt provides a non-exhaustive 
list of what the holder of control power can do: 
• Decide on levels of compensation for officers, directors, and employees; 
• Decide with whom to do business and enter into binding contracts, including contracts 
with related parties; 
• Decide whether to pay dividends and, if so, how much; 
• Register the stock for a public offering; 
• Repurchase outstanding stock or issue new shares; 
• Make acquisitions or divest subsidiaries or divisions; 
• Buy, sell, or hypothecate any or all company assets; 
• Determine capital expenditures; 
• Change the capital structure; 
• Amend the articles of incorporation or bylaws; 
• Sell a controlling interest in the company with or without participation by minority 
shareholders; 
• Select directors, officers, and employees; 
• Determine policy, including changing the direction of the business; 
• Block any of the above. 
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All these prerogatives have led many to think that control has got intrinsic value. Hence, they 
sustained that a premium for control should be paid to reflect this feature into valuations (Pratt, 
2009). 
At this stage a substantial difference must be pointed out. The ownership structure can be 
composed by a different number of shareholders owning a different percentage of shares. In 
this case, each shareholder owns an interest with a specific degree of control. For instance, there 
could be a majority shareholder owing the 60% of shares representing a controlling position 
and the remaining 40% of shares spread among other shareholders representing non-controlling 
positions. This ownership structure gives rise to “control asymmetries” among shareholders’ 
interests. Consequently, these asymmetries justify the existence of premiums and discounts for 
control level differences (Bruner, 2004). This view is coherent with the definition of the 
International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms (2010) stating that control premium is “an 
amount or a percentage by which the pro rata value of a controlling interest exceeds the pro 
rata value of a non-controlling interest in a business enterprise, to reflect the power of control”. 
From this point of view, control premium and discounts for lack of it are modelled as variables 
inversely related like in the following formula: 
 
% 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 = 1 − �
1
1 + % 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝�
 
 
The upside generated by the premium should be perfectly matched with the downside generated 
by discounts. The result of control asymmetries is a difference in the valuation between 
controlling interests and non-controlling interests but the net effect on the enterprise valuation 
must be equal to zero. These adjustments are consistent with the theory of private benefits of 
control. 
The other possibility is that the whole equity is acquired by a unique shareholder. In this case, 
there are no control asymmetries, hence no premium for control is reasonable (Guatri & Bini, 
2005). It is true that the new owner is acquiring the control power but as recognized by the 
Appraisal Practice Board (APB): “the prerogatives of control have little inherent value, but 
rather have value to the extent that their exercise enhances the economic benefits available to 
the owner of the subject controlling interest” (2015). However, the rise of economic benefits is 
better reflected by the acquisition premium. 
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2.2 Acquisition Premium 
The acquisition premium, also called takeover premium, has been previously defined as the 
difference between the price paid and the market value of the target. This variable is much more 
concrete and measurable than the control premium and in academic literature it is widely 
studied.  
Dombret, Mager & Reinschmidt (2008) analysed the influence of country and industry 
variables on the magnitude of takeover premium. The country effect is much more relevant than 
the industry effect. In their study, US and UK showed higher premiums than Germany and 
France. The reason of these differences is due to social and economic features. The industry 
effect is less relevant but we need to emphasise the exception of financial sector which shows 
significantly lower premiums than global takeover premiums. The reasons behind this result 
may be the strong regulations of financial industry and the lower exploitable synergies 
compared to other industries. 
Afterwards Madura, Ngo and Viale (2012) deepen the study of industry effect trying to explain 
why premiums vary across industries and over time. They suggested that expected synergies 
may vary among industries, thus synergies may drive premiums. Further, industry growth 
prospects may enhance competition and consequently increase premiums. They found higher 
premiums in industries which experienced high growth, high concentration and have more 
R&D investments, whereas premiums resulted to be lower after deregulation events. 
Kengelbach, Utzerath, Kaserer and Schatt (2013) in a research for BCG highlighted that in 
M&A transactions, acquirers share expected synergies through acquisition premiums. 
Successful deals show a synergy sharing of around 30% of total synergies. Moreover, they 
showed that synergies not only vary among industries but they vary widely also within the same 
industry thus each deal has got specific value creation opportunities. 
Another variable which may influence the acquisition premium is the nature of the buyer. 
Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz and Zutter (2008) stated that public buyers pay consistently 
higher premiums than private buyers. However, the spread of premiums is much more 
pronounced between public buyers and private equity buyers. Their conclusion associates the 
higher premium paid by public acquirer to expected economic benefits due to synergies with 
respect to private equity buyers. They also noted that the presence of managerial ownership of 
buyers levels the differences due to the public or private nature of the buyer. 
De La Bruslerie (2013) investigated the relation between the acquisition premium and the 
means of payment. Theoretically each deal can be closed by cash, shares or a mix of them. The 
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author found that premiums and cash payments are positively related. The higher the premium, 
the higher the percentage of cash set up in the agreement. The means of payment is influenced 
by the risk embedded into the M&A transaction and asymmetries of information. He showed 
that when an empirical analysis is performed the analysts should not mix the regimes of 
payment. A sample formed by deals with different means of payment would assume a 
continuum from cash to shares payments while M&A transactions are empirically characterized 
by full cash or full shares payments. 
Dionne, La Haye and Bergerès (2015) assumed that blockholders of target’s shares have the 
possibility to be better informed. In case of takeovers, authors showed that blockholders pay 
lower premiums with respect to others because of asymmetry of information. 
Takeover premiums have been also studied by Schlingemann & Wu (2015) who analysed the 
influence of the selling method. They found that targets can maximize the takeover premium 
obtained using auction as sale method because it increases competition among bidders in 
comparison with negotiated sale.  
Another relation analysed is between takeover premium and financial independence of targets. 
Jindra and Moeller (2015) built an indicator of financial independence and showed that highly 
independent targets have more bargaining power during the negotiation phase of M&A deals. 
As a result, they are able to obtain higher premiums. 
In an interesting research, Trapkov, Yakoub and Buhui (2014) found a negative relation 
between premiums received by targets shareholders and the retention of the target CEOs. The 
suggested conclusion is that CEOs have got considerable conflicts of interest during takeovers. 
CEOs may help acquirers to pay lower premiums in exchange of personal benefits like good 
jobs in the new company. 
Sris, Kose and An (2012) tested the relation between takeover premium and the investor’s 
divergence of opinion on the target equity’s value. When opinions are divergent, authors 
conclude that the takeover premium is higher. However, it is also true that very divergent 
opinions tend to limit takeovers. 
Each research mentioned, involves mainly listed companies because of the ease to find data and 
information, however they slightly differ in defining the studied variable. In the article of 
Madura & Ngo, they decided to consider different alternatives to measure the acquisition 
premium. The first way to measure the premium is through the percentage difference between 
the deal’s value and the target firm’s market value one day before the announcement date. This 
definition highlights the increase of value the bidder offers with respect to the prevalent market 
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valuation. Financial press commonly use this approach when they refer to a recent bid. The 
main limit of measuring the premium with a so narrow time window is that it does not reflect 
the leakage of information occurring before the announcement, and which practically would 
show a more expensive acquisition. The leakage phenomenon has been demonstrated by 
Schwert (1996) and its influence is mostly concentrated in the 20 trading days before the 
announcement date. This shortcoming pushed the authors to develop a second way to measure 
the premium. This variation considers as target firm’s market value the price of shares four 
weeks (20 trading days) before the announcement date. Even if, this new way takes into 
consideration the pre-announcement leakage effects, both approaches have the limit of not 
considering the post announcement movements of prices. The solution provided is a third way 
of measuring the premium. It is defined as the difference between the target’s value at the 
effective (completion) date of the M&A and the price four weeks before the announcement. 
Even this measure is not exempt from shortcomings. However, its main flaw is not about the 
quality of the measure but about the complexity of the computational process, because the 
period between the announcement of the M&A and the effective date is different for each 
takeover (Madura & Ngo, 2008). These three ways to compute the acquisition premium are the 
most important in literature.  
A variation proposed by the APB to select the target firm’s market value is to consider not a 
single price at a specific pre-deal date but the average of stock prices over a limited period of 
time preceding the announcement date. They believe this approach to improve relevance and 
reliability of data. 
Professionals in business practice but also academic researchers in universities can use different 
databases to obtain data on acquisition premiums. Some of these sources are the FactSet 
Mergerstat®/BVR Control Premium Study, the S&P Capital IQ and the Thomson Reuters SDC 
Platinum™. For instance, the BVR Control Premium Study defines its Mergerstat® Control 
Premium as the “premium computed by comparing the price ultimately paid to the unaffected 
stock price”. The formula is: 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶® 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑉𝑉 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝 = �
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉 𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉 𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑉𝑉 𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 
𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉 𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑉𝑉 𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆
− 1� 
 
Where, the numerator is the total consideration paid per share for the target firm's shares, 
denominated in the home currency of the target company. While the denominator is the target 
company's common stock price per share unaffected by the acquisition announcement. The 
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stock price is selected by the database after analysing each transaction (Business Valuation 
Resources, 2016).  
Considering the SDC database, some authors deepen the study on data choice in relation with 
premiums computation. The SDC records two relevant dates, the date announced (DA) and the 
original data announced (ODA). The DA is the date when the first public disclosure about the 
transaction is made, whereas ODA is the date when the target is publicly known to be a takeover 
candidate. They observed that the premiums are underestimated when the DA is used as 
reference to the price rather than the ODA. This result denies the common hypothesis used in 
many studies which assume no information of the M&A are available to the market before the 
announcement date. Thus, it proves the existence of a leakage effect and recommend the use of 
ODA while estimating premiums (Mulherin & Aziz Simsir, 2015). 
 
2.3 Representation and Relation with Leverage 
Considered the different ways by which the acquisition premium can be defined and computed, 
they all have a common characteristic. The outcomes of these approaches are always percentage 
differences based on the equity value of the target entity. Although the acquisition premium is 
a monetary amount resulting from the difference between two values, price paid and stand-
alone value of the target, academics, professionals and financial press represent it as a 
percentage. This is the traditional way of expressing premiums and it can be defined as “equity 
foundation approach” (Appraisal Practices Board, 2015). The reason and advantage behind this 
choice of representing premiums as percentages is due to the possibility of enhancing 
comparability among transactions which involve firms of different size. 
An important insight on the representation of the acquisition premium was pointed out by 
Timothy Meinhart in 2013. He stated that the pre-acquisition leverage of the target company 
may influence the reported acquisition premium of an M&A transaction. More precisely, the 
risk of representing premiums in the traditional way is that percentage premiums may result to 
be overstated, simply because the traditional way does not consider the effect of leverage 
(Meinhart, 2013). 
The idea behind this overestimation effect starts from the capital structure of the target. A high 
level of indebtedness chosen by the target allows the acquirer to obtain the control of the overall 
enterprise with less cash or shares with respect to a target with a lower level of indebtedness 
(more capitalized), other things equal. At the same time, the acquisition premium paid is related 
to benefits arising from the M&A transaction, like managerial improvements, synergies and/or 
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private benefits of control. These increases in value come from the entire enterprise and not just 
the equity. Therefore, when the capital structure of the target firm shows a high level of 
indebtedness, the absolute amount of the acquisition premium is compared with a low level of 
equity. As consequence, if all the other factors are equal, more levered targets may imply bigger 
percentage acquisition premiums. The following charts illustrate graphically this intuition and 
the relationship between the percentage acquisition premium and the leverage: 
 
Chart 4 - Consideration for 100% of Equity 
 
Source: Covrig et al., 2015 with adaptation 
 
Chart 5 – Cost of Premium 
 
Source: Covrig et al., 2015 with adaptation 
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Chart 6 - Percent Acquisition Premium 
 
Source: Covrig et al., 2015 with adaptation 
 
All charts have the leverage on the horizontal axis as independent variable, represented by the 
debt to assets ratio. It can vary from 0% (no debt financing) to 100% (full debt financing). At 
the same time, each of those relates the leverage with a different dependent variable: 
consideration paid for the 100% of equity, cost of premium and percentage acquisition 
premium. Chart 4 shows a decrease in the amount of consideration paid for the part representing 
the stand-alone value of the whole equity as the leverage (Debt/Assets) increase, other things 
equal. This is due to the enterprise value formula: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 = 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸 𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 + 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 
 
At the same time, Chart 5 shows a negative relation between the monetary amount of premium 
and leverage. As leverage increase the cost of premium on equity goes down. 
Finally, Chart 6 points out that the percentage acquisition premium rises with leverage, other 
things equal. Hence, a high leveraged target would show a bigger premium than a lower 
leveraged target (Covrig, et al., 2015). 
A practical example to better understand the overestimation effect and a possible solution is 
provided in chart 7 below. Assume three target companies A, B and C. The underlying 
hypothesis of this example is companies to be similar. They operate in the same industry and 
they have relatively similar operations. The traditional way of expressing acquisition premiums 
would show three different percentages because of the different capital structures of the 
companies. In particular, company A with a lower level of debt shows a lower percentage 
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premium (35%) with respect to company C (70%) which has a higher level of debt. Company 
B which has a level of debt comprised between companies A and C has a percentage premium 
of 47%. These differences create a range of percentage premiums that vary widely without an 
economic underlying reason but only because of a computational issue. 
For instance, if the reason of computing the premium is to use historical data to derive a control 
premium, valuation analysts use to compute the average of a comparable set of similar 
companies. In this case, if the three companies were used as comparables with the equity 
foundation approach the derived control premium would be 51%. As theoretically stated, the 
problem of this data is caused by the fact of not considering the different capital structures of 
comparable companies. 










Market Value of Aggregate Equity Prior to M&A Announcement  100,000  75,000   50,000   
+ + + +  
Market Value of Debt Prior to M&A Announcement 30,000  55,000  80,000  
= = = =  
Market Value of Invested Capital Prior to M&A Announcement  130,000 130,000   130,000  
     
Acquisition Premium Offered for the Equity 35,000 35,000 35,000  
     
Equity Foundation Approach 
     
A - Monetary Value of the Acquisition Premium 35,000 35,000 35,000  
B - Market Value of Aggregate Equity Prior to M&A Announcement 100,000 75,000 50,000    
 = = =  
A/B - Percentage Acquisition Premium based on Equity 35% 47% 70% 51% 
     
Total Invested Capital Foundation Approach 
     
A - Monetary Value of the Acquisition Premium 35,000 35,000 35,000  
C - Market Value of Invested Capital Prior to M&A Announcement 130,000 130,000 130,000    
 = = =  










Source: Meinhart T.J., 2013 with adaptation 
 
The solution proposed by Meinhart and subsequently by the APB (2013) is to express the 
acquisition premium as a percentage based on the total invested capital of companies before the 
deal. This new approach tries to take into account the different level of indebtedness of the 
comparables. It should align the percentage acquisition premiums avoiding the distortion 
caused by the overestimation effect. 
It is true that adopting the equity foundation approach as way to express the acquisition 
premium has the advantage of enhancing the comparably among targets with different sizes, 
but it also worsens the comparability of companies with different capital structures. The 
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suggested solution is defined as “total invest capital (TIC) foundation approach”, it maintains 
the percentage format which allows size comparability and it has the additional advantage of 
overcoming the leverage effect. Thanks to these pros, the best practices suggested by APB 
advise to use the TIC foundation approach to express the acquisition premium. 
 
2.3.1 Results of Empirical Analysis 
To empirically verify the above explained relationship between the acquisition premium and 
the leverage, Covrig, McConaughy and Travers (2015) performed an empirical analysis. They 
tested the link between the observed percentage acquisition premium with the pre-acquisition 
leverage. Their aim was to prove the distortion in percentages due to the overestimation effect 
caused by leverage.  
The final sample was extracted from the FactSet MergerStat®/BVR Control Premium Study 
and contained 1,020 observations of all-cash acquisitions from 2003 to 2013 made in the U.S. 
with an observed equity control premium from 0% to 200%. They stated that negative 
premiums and over 200% premiums were outliers. Moreover, they excluded from the sample 
section 6 of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) containing financial institutions. 
The selected dependent variable was the mergerstat® control premium, this was computed 
comparing the price paid to the unaffected stock price. Whereas the explanatory variables of 
their model were the percent unaffected equity (PCTUNAFFEQ) as a reverse measure of 
leverage, the total invested capital (TIC), the sales as size of the business, EBITDA over SALES 
as a proxy of profitability, synergies as the potential for increasing economic benefits, dummy 
variables for the type of acquirer like strategic, financial or horizontal, dummy variables to 
specify the year in which the transaction took place and dummy variables for the industry of 
the target company. 
The first type of analysis they performed was a simple descriptive and correlation analysis of 
the data. The result of those analysis was the decision of deepen the statistical study because 
the percentage acquisition premium, TIC and EBITDA profit showed a drop with a decrease of 
leverage, represented by an increase of the PCTUNAFFEQ. This pushed the authors to analyse 





Chart 8 - Results of Regression Analysis by Covrig et al. 
















C 0.641 0.596 0.787 0.756 0.828 0.817 0.875 
t-statistic 19.542 17.939 16.553 15.707 17.176 14.498 13.713 
LOG (TIC) -0.105 -0.075 -0.078 -0.079 -0.078 -0.078 -0.074 
t-statistic -8.721 -5.745 -6.064 -6.152 -6.144 -6.134 -5.715 
EBITDAtoSALES  -0.336 -0.332 -0.312 -0.306 -0.305 -0.301 
t-statistic  -5.828 -5.853 -5.495 -5.400 -5.373 -5.242 
PCTUNAFFEQ   -0.220 -0.242 -0.245 -0.247 -0.240 
t-statistic   -5.545 -6.049 -6.156 -6.160 -5.845 
STRATEGIC    0.068    
t-statistic    3.465    
FINANCIAL     -0.083 -0.083 -0.087 
t-statistic     -4.128 -4.126 -4.259 
SYN      0.000 0.000 
t-statistic      0.393 -0.199 
Industry       YES 
Dummy        
Time Dummy       YES 

















Source: Covrig et al., 2015 
 
These regressions analysis have been performed to better understand the link between control 
premium and the leverage, controlling for several variables which resulted to be correlated with 
premium. The first three regressions confirmed the negative correlation of control premium 
with TIC, profitability (EBITDAtoSALES) and the percentage of equity (PCTUNAFFEQ). The 
regression 4 and 5 introduce the type of acquirer1, showing that premiums paid in strategic 
acquisitions are higher than in financial acquisitions. Regression 6 shows the potential of 
synergies to be a statistically insignificant explanatory variable. The last regression includes all 
the explanatory variables, including industry and time dummies. It concludes that all the 
variables are statistically significant apart from synergies and reach an adjusted R-squared of 
16%. 
Covrig, McConaughy and Travers affirm the analysis to prove a strong relationship between 
control premium and the leverage. The greater the leverage, the bigger the percentage of control 
premium. This result is coherent with the best practice suggested by the appraisal practice board 
and the intuition of Meinhart. Moreover, the authors suggest to use the significant explanatory 
variables as selecting criteria by valuation analysts, whenever a panel of comparables is needed 
to compute the control premium in an M&A transaction. 
                                                 
1 Strategic and Financial dummy variables were found to be strongly negative correlated. Authors decided to do 
not consider them at the same time in the regression model. 
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The last important result is deductible from the sign of the coefficients in chart 8. All the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables, with exception of strategic acquisitions, are negative. 
The marginal effect of each variable would reduce the impact of leverage on control premium. 
These results resize the impact that the appraisal practice board suggests the leverage may have 
on expressing the acquisition premium with the equity foundation approach. 
 
2.4 Adjustment Methods 
After the empirical analysis of the relationship between the acquisition premium and the 
leverage, the same authors developed two methods to adjust the observed percentage 
acquisition premiums for valuation purposes (Covrig, et al., 2016). The adjustment or 
normalization processes should allow valuation analysts to correct the distortion caused by the 
leverage on premiums observed in markets. As previously stated, stripping out the leverage 
effect would enhance the comparability of data. 
 
2.4.1 Method 1: De-Levering and Re-Levering 
The first method is based on two equations provided by the APB (2015). It expresses the 
acquisition premium based on the TIC foundation approach as a function of the acquisition 
premium based on the equity foundation approach. The first equation is called de-levering 
formula, while the second is called re-levering formula. As matter of notation, we indicate the 
new representation proposal of the acquisition premium as premium(TIC) and the traditional 
representation as premium(E). While equity stands for the market value of equity and TIC (total 
invested capital) is the value of the equity plus the face value of all interest-bearing debt and 
book value of preferred stock outstanding before the M&A announcement date. 
 
De-levering formula: 





Both, premium(TIC) and premium(E) are expressed as percentages. The Equity/TIC ratio is a 
representation of leverage. This equation shows that an increase in leverage represented by a 
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decrease of the equity/TIC ratio, results in a lower acquisition premium(TIC). Restating the 
equation, the traditional premium(E) can be expressed as dependent variable. 
 
Re-levering formula: 





Consequently, it can be seen from the rearrangement obtained that premium(E) rises when 
leverage increase (overestimation effect). This set of equations can be applied to a panel of 
similar transactions, which should involve comparable targets only differing in their capital 
structures and premiums. The application of this method produces a reference premium(E) from 
comparables which should not be overstated by leverage. This reference premium(E) is then 
used on the specific target equity to obtain the monetary amount of acquisition premium for the 
specific transaction. 
The computational process is simple and it is composed by two parts. The first part requires the 
use of the de-levering formula. Applying this formula to each comparable M&A transaction, 
we derive all premiums(TIC). Each premium(TIC) is obtained multiplying the observed 
premiums(E) of the comparable firm by its pre-deal Equity/TIC ratio. Then, the average of all 
these premiums(TIC) is computed. This is the outcome needed for the second part. Once the 
average premium(TIC) is obtained, the second part of the process requires the use of the re-
levering formula. Applying the second formula, we can compute premium(E) for the specific 
target. The target premium(E) is obtained multiplying the average Premium(TIC) of comparables 
by the equity/TIC ratio of the target. The Premium(E) found takes into account the differences 
due to the various capital structures of the comparables. A numerical example to better 
understand the process is provided in chart 10. 
In this example three past transactions involved companies with very different capital 
structures. From a high levered comparable 1 with a pre-deal Equity/TIC of 20%, to a low 
levered company 3 with a pre-deal Equity/TIC of 90%, thus with an increasing level of 
capitalization. The simple average of the observed premiums(E) on markets is 40.7%. This is 
the commonly used data to compute the acquisition premium which could be offered in an 
M&A operation. Whereas the resulting premium(E) after the normalization process, performed 
by method 1, is 28%. 
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Chart 9 - Example of Method 1 
 
1) Computation of Comparable Transactions Premium(TIC) 
      
 Comparable 1 Comparable 2 Comparable 3  Average 
Premium(E) 50.0% 40.0% 32.0% A 40.7% 
Pre-deal Equity/TIC 20.0% 50.0% 90.0% B 53.3% 
Premium(TIC) 10.0% 20.0% 28.8% A x B 19.6% 
      
2) Computation of Target Premium(E) 
      
Equity/TIC of the Target 70.0% C    
Average Premium(TIC) 19.6% D    






    
Source: Covrig et al., 2016 with adaptation 
 
As it can be seen, the traditional procedure tends to overstate the acquisition premium. In this 
case, the overestimation account for almost 13 percentage points more. 
The authors note that given the benefits of the method, namely the method tries to take into 
account the effect of leverage to avoid possible overestimations, this procedure shows some 
flaws. They point out that “although the subject (target) Equity/TIC of 70% is higher than the 
Equity/TIC values of Comp 1 and Comp 2, the re-levered subject company’s control premium 
of 28% is lower than the control premia of Comp 1 and Comp 2”. This seems to me a right 
conclusion but not a limit of the method. In fact, the expected premium(E) for a target with an 
Equity/TIC of 70%, so lower than Comp 3 and higher than Comp 2 and 1, should lie between 
the respective premium(E) of comparables 2 and 3 given by the proportional relationship of 
acquisition premium2 and leverage. Hence, the limit of this method is that the found premium(E) 
(28%) should be higher than the premium(E) of comp 3 (32%) which has a lower leverage than 
the target company.  
Further the de-levered acquisition premiums of the comparables, namely premiums(TIC), have a 
wide range of variance from 10% to 28,8% while in theory this range should be very narrow. 
The opinion is that these flaws are due to excess sensibility of this adjustment method which is 
solely focused on changes of the capital structure. As authors showed in the previous article, 
the effect of leverage on the acquisition premium is not so important as the de-levering and re-
levering method implies because it is moderate by the negative effects of other variables like 
deal size, target profitability, presence of financial buyers or positive effect of the presence of 
                                                 
2 See chart 6 
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a strategical buyer. This was clearly visible by the coefficients of the regression analysis that 
showed negative marginal effects of the other variables. 
 
2.4.2 Method 2: Calibration 
The second method is an attempt to solve the shortcomings of the first method. Method 2 takes 
advantage of the multivariate regression model of Covrig, McConaughy, and Travers  (2015)3. 
Using regression 3 of chart 8 and the average values of their previous study, namely the mean 
value of EBITDA to sales ratios and the log of the mean of total invested capitals, the authors 
extracted an adjustment factor to correct the influence of pre-deal Equity/TIC ratio in the de-
levering and re-levering formulas. 
The adjustment factor is obtained through a so-called “calibration” process. The aim of this 
process is to find a factor that combined with the de-levering formula, using the coefficients of 
the regression analysis and adding the average values of the explanatory variables, produces a 
premium(E) which is the same of an unlevered firm (expressed by a value of PCTUNAFFEQ 
equal to 100%). The adjustment factor makes the premium(E) obtained with the modified 
formula and different capital structures equal to the expected premium(E) of the unlevered firm 
and takes into account other influencing factors. 
The authors applied the adjustment factor to the formulas of the first method and the results are 
two modified equations. 
 
Modified De-levering formula with the adjustment factor 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) = 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸) × �1 − �100% −  
𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 �
× 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶� 
 
Modified Re-levering formula with the adjustment factor 
𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸) =
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇)
�1 − �100% − 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 �× 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶�
  
 
                                                 
3 See subparagraph 2.3.1 
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From their computations, using market data, the factor has resulted to be 0.5. Using the same 
data of the chart 10, a new example to better understand the process of method 2 is provided in 
chart 11: 
Chart 10 - Example of Method 2 
 
1) Computation of Comparable Transactions Premium(TIC) 
      
Adjustment Factor from regression Analysis = 0.5 
      
 Comparable 1 Comparable 2 Comparable 3  Average 
Premium(E) 50.0% 40.0% 32.0% A 40.7% 
Pre-deal Equity/TIC 20.0% 50.0% 90.0% B 53.3% 
Premium(TIC) 30.0% 30.0% 30.4% A x B 30.1% 
      
2) Computation of Target Premium(E) 
      
Equity/TIC of the Target 70.0% C    
Average Premium(TIC) 30.1% D    






    
Source: Covrig et al., 2016 with adaptation 
 
The first step is to compute premiums(TIC) for each comparable with the modified de-levering 
formula. In this example, they result to be very close to 30%. The narrow range of premiums(TIC) 
is consistent with theory and it is due to the calibration process. In the second step the target 
premium(E) is computed using the modified re-levering formula. The obtained premium(E) in the 
example is 35.5%. Note that, this value is comprised between the premiums(E) of comparables 
2 and 3 as well as the Equity/TIC ratio of the target is comprised between Equity/TIC ratios of 
comparables. This is a remarkable result because it reflects the theoretical framework in which 
the acquisition premium is proportional to leverage. In fact, the Equity/TIC ratios are aligned 
with premiums(E) of comparables and target. 
The comparison of method 1 with method 2 highlights the fact that method 1 is based only on 
the leverage factor and consequently overstate the resulting premium(E). Thanks to the 
calibration process and the adjustment factor, the modified formulas provide results which are 
more aligned with theory. Method 2 exploits the benefits of using market data which are known 
influencing the acquisition premium and not only adjusting it for the effect of leverage.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS IN THE EU MARKET 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Several studies involving the acquisition premium were listed in the previous chapter4.  Most 
of empirical researches had the aim of demonstrating relationships between the acquisition 
premium, or equivalent forms of premiums, and specific explanatory variables of interest. The 
importance of premiums for corporate finance researchers and practitioners is due to the fact 
that “often there is more money at stake in determining what discounts or premiums are 
applicable to some business valuations, than there is in arriving at the base value itself” (Pratt, 
2009).  
The insight of Meinhart about the computational bias of acquisition premium and the interest 
of the Appraisal Practice Board to develop a guideline on the measurement of what they call 
the “market participant acquisition premium”, pushed Covrig, McConaughy, and Travers to 
deeply investigate the issue of premium representation. Their main focus was the analysis of 
the relationship between the traditional way of expressing premiums and the pre-deal leverage 
of target companies in the Mergers & Acquisitions market of US. In fact, they argued that if 
there is a positive relationship between the target leverage and the percentage premium, this 
proves the overestimation effect of the traditional representation. The proposed solution by the 
APB is to express the acquisition premium as a ratio based on the total invested capital and not 
based on the equity value of the target company. Even if the empirical results of Covrig et al. 
were quite impressive and validate this proposal, this way of expressing premiums in business 
practice and academic literature is still at the embryonic phase. Furthermore, they tried to 
develop two methods to adjust the existent data on premiums for the purpose of business 
valuations. The first one is a simple proportional method, while the second one is a more 
sophisticated method which imply the use of market data through a so-called calibration 
process. 
The only empirical research in academic literature on the representation of acquisition premium 
is the study of Covrig et al., so we decided to contribute the academic knowledge through an 
                                                 
4 See paragraph 2.2 
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updated study in the Mergers & Acquisitions market of Eurozone. It is relevant to analyse the 
representation issue in this market because of the difference between the US and the aggregate 
EU markets. The next sections analyse and discuss an empirical support to verify the possible 
presence and the magnitude of the relationship between premium(E)5 and the pre-deal leverage 
of target company within the Eurozone. The analysis uses many of the explanatory variables 
found in the academic literature and past empirical researches as control variables to enhance 
results. Moreover, we try to determine whether alternative measures of premiums, like 
premiums based on TIC or enterprise value, would be free of this computational bias.  
 
3.2 Hypothesis 
Academic literature suggests that leverage has the effect of increasing the dimension of percent 
premium(E) because of a mere computational distortion. This may be referred as an 
overestimation effect of the traditional way of expressing premium based on the pre-deal equity 
value. The existence of this effect can be proved verifying whether, on average, an increase of 
target pre-deal leverage corresponds to a higher percentage value of premium(E), other things 
equal. 
Another hypothesis we want to verify through our analysis is that expressing premium on TIC 
value ( premium(TIC) ) or expressing premium on enterprise value ( premium(EV) ) are better ways 
to represent premium which could allow a greater level of comparability. This is because, they 
should be less influenced by the pre-deal leverage. The existence of this condition can be proved 
verifying whether, on average, a variation of pre-deal leverage does not substantially influence 
the dimension of alternative measures of the premium. Hence, they should be uncorrelated to 
pre-deal leverage of target company, other things equal. 
 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Sample and Data source 
To verify our hypotheses, we extracted all M&A transactions from the S&P Capital IQ 
database6. Our sample was formed by all completed mergers, acquisitions and acquisitions of 
                                                 
5 See subparagraph 2.4.1 
6 S&P Capital IQ developed by McGraw-Hill financial is one of the most reliable and comprehensive financial 
database available on the market containing detailed information of stocks, transactions, deals and estimates and 
a leading provider of multi-asset class and real time data, research and analytics. 
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majority interest, which imply an exchange of control7. All transactions were completed 
between 2000 and 2016. As a matter of data availability, we selected only transactions which 
involved publicly listed targets at the time of deals. As a geographical restriction, the sample 
had only targets with headquarters based within the Eurozone8.  
We considered only 100% cash acquisitions as means of payment, as suggested by empirical 
researches (de La Bruslerie, 2013). We excluded SIC 6 which represents finance, insurance and 
real estate sectors and limited the observed premium(E) to the range 0% and 300% excluded. In 
fact, transactions showing a negative or zero premium were not considered relevant for the 
purpose of the present analysis, while transactions showing a premium greater than 300% were 
considered outliers. Furthermore, we dropped all companies with negative or zero total invested 
capital and enterprise value. Based on these selection criteria, we obtained a sample of 1310 
observations with complete data. 
 
3.3.2 Variables 
Our statistical analysis used the following variables, which were extracted for each observation 
from the S&P Capital IQ database. In addition, some variables were constructed starting from 




Premium(E) – Percentage premium computed by comparing the monetary amount of 
premium to the pre-deal equity value of target company. 
= [(MONETARY AMOUNT OF PREMIUM / PRE-DEAL EQUITY VALUE) – 1] 
 
Where, Monetary Amount of Premium = Implied Equity Value – Pre-Deal Equity Value.  
                                                 
7 In order to filter transactions that involve control transfers, we selected only those transactions in which buyers 
gained a control position of more than 50% of outstanding shares. 
8 Eurozone: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Channel Islands, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom 
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Where, Implied Equity Value = Target Market Value of Equity based on the offer price per 
share times the total reported outstanding shares at the time of transaction.  
Where, Pre-Deal Equity Value = Target Market Value of Equity based on the price per share 1 
month (30 days) prior the announcement date of the transaction times the total outstanding 
shares. 
 
Premium(EV) = Percentage premium computed by comparing the monetary amount of 
premium to the pre-deal enterprise value (EV) of target company. 
= [(MONETARY AMOUNT OF PREMIUM / PRE-DEAL ENTERPRISE VALUE) – 1] 
  
Where, Pre-Deal Enterprise Value = Net Financial Position + Minority Interests + Pre-Deal 
Equity Value 
Where, Net Financial Position = Total Debt – Cash & Equivalents. These last two elements 
and the value of minority interests were extracted from the last available financial statement of 
the targets before the announcement date. 
 
Premium(TIC) = Percentage premium computed by comparing the monetary amount of 
premium to the pre-deal total invested capital of target company. 
= [(MONETARY AMOUNT OF PREMIUM / PRE-DEAL TOTAL INVESTED CAPITAL) – 1] 
 
Where, Pre-Deal Total Invested Capital = Total Debt + Minority Interests + Pre-Deal Equity 
Value 
 
Independent Continuous Variables: 
 
EQUITYtoTIC = Percentage measure of pre-deal leverage of the target computed as pre-deal 
equity value to total invested capital 
= (PRE-DEAL EQUITY VALUE / PRE-DEAL TOTAL INVESTED CAPITAL) 
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For the purpose of computing the equitytoTIC ratio we added minority interests to the pre-deal 
equity value at the book value of last available financial statement. EquitytoTIC is the main 
independent variable and is used as proxy of financial structure of the target. 
 
EV = Pre-deal enterprise value of target company, as previously defined. Since the Pre-deal 
EV vary from millions of euro to billions of euro, in the regression analyses we use the 
logarithm base e of the pre-deal EV. Minority interests where added at the book value like S&P 
Capital IQ suggests. This variable is used as proxy for stand-alone value of the target. 
 
TIC = Pre-deal total invested capital of target company, as previously defined. Since the Pre-
deal TIC vary from millions of euro to billions of euro, in the regression analyses we use the 
logarithm base e of the pre-deal TIC. 
 
Sales = Amount of sales as reported in the last available financial statement of target company. 
Since the sales vary from thousands to billions of euro, in the regression analyses we use the 
logarithm base e of the sales. This variable is used as proxy for size of business. 
 
EBITDA margin = Percentage ratio between the EBITDA and the sales as reported in the 
last available financial statement of the target. This variable is used as measure of operating 
profit margin, to approximate the profitability of the target business. 
 
Independent Categorical Variables: 
 
Acquirer - This dummy variable describes type of buyer involved in the transaction. The 
dummy variable takes value = 0 if the acquirer is a financial buyer or it takes value = 1 if the 
acquirer is a strategic buyer. 
 
Attitude - These dummy variables describe whether the attitude of the deal was hostile, 
friendly or at the beginning was friendly and then became hostile. 
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Country - Each dummy of the countries’ list takes value of 1 if the country of the target is the 
same of the dummy otherwise 0. There were created 33 country dummies since 34 countries 
were considered. The country segmentation was based on the location of the targets 
headquarter. 
 
Cross Border - This dummy variable describes whether the transaction involves a buyer and 
target located in the same country (dummy value = 1) or in different countries (dummy         
value = 0). 
 
Industry - Each dummy of the industries’ list takes value of 1 if the industry of the target is 
the same of the dummy otherwise 0. There were created 8 industry dummies since 9 sectors 
were considered. The industry segmentation was based on the primary first two-digit SIC 
CODE of the target. 
 
Year - These dummy variables describe the year of completion of the transaction. Each 
dummy of the years’ list takes value = 1 if the year of the transaction is the same of the dummy 
otherwise 0. There were created 16 time dummies because 17 years were considered. 
 
With respect to academic literature we did not include the variable representing potential 
synergies, because the access to these kind of information as externals is difficult and extremely 
imprecise. Moreover, in the cited regression analysis9 this variable has resulted to be 
statistically insignificant. 
Because of the great diversity of regulations of public M&A markets (Herbert Smith Freehills, 
2015) and more generally, of different market rules within the Eurozone, we decided to add the 
country explanatory variable as proxy of these conditions. As literature suggests, we considered 
also the possibility that the buyer was not based in the same country of the target through the 
cross border explanatory variable. Another aspect that we improved in our analysis is the 
introduction of an attitude explanatory variable, meaning the attitude of management toward 
the transaction. 
 
                                                 
9 See sub-paragraph 2.3.1 – chart 8 
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3.4 Empirical Analysis 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The main information about the categorical variables of the sample are shown in tables 1-3.  
 
Table 1 – Transactions by Year 
 
Source: our calculations 
 
The number of transactions by year in the sample and the percentage of deals with respect to 
the whole sample is represented in table 1. The first half of the table shows an increasing trend 
until 2007, then an alternate decrease in volume is visible. This change in trend clearly coincide 
with the financial crisis of 2008 started in the United States and spread all over the globe. Note 
that, the sample is formed by 58.47% transactions completed before and during 2008 and 
41.53% of transactions completed after 2008. To account for this important event, we built a 
dummy explanatory variable to better specify the regression model. 
The spatial localization of deals is shown in table 2. As previously stated, the country variable 
is used as proxy for market regulation differences. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of targets 
companies of the sample (41.69%) was based in United Kingdom. In fact, this country has an 
attractive company law system and the most important financial market within the Eurozone. 
France (10.52%) and Germany (6.94%) represent respectively the second and the third place of 
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To improve our analysis, we tried to use the grouping system of the United Nations (2017)10.  
 
Table 2 - Transactions by Country 
 
Source: our calculations 
                                                 
10 
Eastern Europe Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland 
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Ukraine 
Northern Europe Channel Islands, Denmark, Estonia, Faeroe Islands, Finland, Guernsey, Iceland, 
Ireland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sark, Svalbard and Jan Mayen 
Islands, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
Southern Europe Andorra. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Gibraltar, Greece, Holy See, Italy, Malta, 
Montenegro, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 










































































The percentage distribution of deals by sub-regions in the sample is the following:            
Northern Europe 58.47%, Western Europe 28.32%, Eastern Europe 6.79%, Southern Europe 
6.41%. 
The industry classification of targets is another sample feature considered. The segmentation 
performed was done through the use of the primary Standard Industrial Classification of the 
acquired companies. The formed groups are based on the first digit of the SIC code excluding 
the SIC 6 as suggested by literature. 
 
Table 3 – Percentage of Transactions by Industry 
 
Source: our calculations 
 
In table 3 we can see that main sectors involved are manufacturing with 36.86% and services 
with 32.81%. Transportation & public utilities represent the third position in ranking while the 
other categories are residuals. 
We conclude the qualitative description describing the attitude of the transaction and the type 
of acquirer. For what concern the attitude, the vast majority of transactions were classified as 









as friendly to hostile 0.92%. Whereas, with respect to the type of acquirer, 77.89% were defined 
as strategic buyers and 22.11% as financial buyers. 
The main statistical descriptive information on the continues variables of sample are contained 
in table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Descriptive Data 
 Mean Median Min Max Std Skewness / 
Kurtosis 
Premium(E) % 








30.05 22.55 0.00 235.13 29.13 
2.64 / 
13.69 
Sales (€ mln) 
558.83 106.74 0.00 22270.80 1566.59 
7.20 / 
73.78 
EV (€ mln) 
698.14 109.61 0.05 65887.06 2603.74 
14.29 / 
313.85 
TIC (€ mln) 
758.15 126.49 0.30 66891.06 2716.04 
13.45 / 
282.97 
EBITDA margin % 
10.90 10.27 -182.32 107.49 22.31 
-2.93 / 
26.48 
Equity to TIC % 
79.08 84.61 5.58 100.00 21.01 
-1.00 / 
3.31 
Source: our calculations 
 
It shows the three different ways of representing premium. Premium(E) is the traditional 
representation method and has a median value of 30.01%, premium(EV) and premium(TIC) 
respectively show medians of 26.38% and 22.55%. This decreasing trend is in line with our 
expectations because the relations among Equity value, Enterprise value (EV) and Total Invest 
Capital (TIC). It is important to notice that the same trend is not visible with respect to mean 
values. In particular, Premium (EV) has a mean of 40.26%. This is due to the fact that median 
indexes are less subject to extreme values of distributions while arithmetic mean values do not. 
It worth noting that premium(E) and premium(TIC) vary from little more than 0 to little less than 
300, this because of the selection of this range was done on premium(E) at the sample level. 
Given the way in which TIC was built, as the sum of equity value, minority interests and total 
debt amount, we conclude that TIC is always greater or equal to the equity value. This is 
important because it is reflected in the property that premium(E) is always greater or equal to 
premium(TIC). All this reasoning is not valid for enterprise value because it is the sum of equity 
value and net financial position (NFP). The NFP assumes positive values when debt is greater 
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than cash & equivalents but in extreme cases it assumes negative values. When NFP is negative 
the premium(EV) resulted to be greater than premium(EV). In our sample, 17 observations showed 
a negative NFP. 
From a theoretical point of view, TIC and EV represent the same thing, namely the company 
stand-alone value. It is usual in finance to prefer the enterprise value as measure. TIC is always 
greater than EV by definition and the range of values in the sample vary for both measures from 
less than 1 million to around 65 billions of Euro11. 
The pre-deal equity to TIC ratio vary from 5.58%, which represents a transaction involving a           
highly-levered company, to 100% which represents an unlevered company. However, the mean 
and median values show that on average, target companies have a low level of debt. 
 
3.4.2 Correlation Matrix and Statistical Analyses 
As preliminary way to understand the relationships and influences among different ways of 
expressing premium and each specific explanatory variables at the aggregate sample level, we 
used a simple correlation matrix. This matrix is reported in table 5. It contains all three 
dependent variables and the continuous explanatory variables. Within the matrix are shown all 
the correlation values among variables. 
All three ways to represent premiums are weakly negative correlated with Sales, EV, TIC and 
EBITDA margin. With reference to equity to TIC, its correlation with premium(E) is negative 
as expected from theory. Whereas, the correlation between equity to TIC and premium(EV) is 
positive and even more positive is the correlation between it and premium(TIC).  
An important aspect to highlight is the very strong positive correlation between EV and TIC. It 
suggests a possible multicollinearity problem between these two variables. The same is true for 




                                                 






















































































































































































































































As further tools of analysis we used tables 6 and 7. Both these tables are built following 
academic literature. The first step of the building procedure is to sort all the observations with 
respect to a selected meaningful variable of interest. Once the observations are sorted in 
ascending order, the second step is to segment all the variables of the sample in 5 classes with 
the same number of observations each one. The last step is to compute a position index for each 
class, like the median, to understand how the variables vary with respect to the variable selected 
as ordering criteria. We introduced also the percentage variation (Δ%) among classes to help 
the reader to better visualize trends12.  
 
Table 6 – Descriptive Data: Medians of classes sorted by Sales 
 
Class 1  Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 
 (smallest)    (largest) 
Premium (E) %  34.71   30.43   30.77   29.35   25.86  
Δ%  -14.05% 1.10% -4.85% -13.50% 
Premium (EV) %  35.68   27.12   26.13   24.53   21.16  
Δ%  -31.55% -3.82% -6.53% -15.91% 
Premium (TIC) %  28.42   23.11   22.53   21.14   18.72  
Δ%  -22.96% -2.56% -6.59% -12.90% 
Sales (€ mln)  14.52   46.91   106.74   269.55   1,272.80  
Δ%  69.04% 56.05% 60.40% 78.82% 
EV (€ mln)  17.57   47.25   107.61   205.48   1,175.59  
Δ%  62.82% 56.09% 47.63% 82.52% 
TIC (€ mln)  22.67   54.11   124.62   241.39   1,289.71  
Δ%  58.11% 56.58% 48.37% 81.28% 
EBITDA margin %  7.95   10.61   11.18   11.45   10.02  
Δ%  25.09% 5.07% 2.43% -14.26% 
Equity to TIC %  96.61   90.56   83.10   80.19   75.61  
Δ%  -6.68% -8.99% -3.62% -6.06% 
Source: our calculations 
 
Table 6 applies this analysis technique to the sample with respect to sales variable. This variable 
is considered to be a proxy of target business size. In this table, class 1 contains all the 
observations with the smallest values of sales, whereas class 5 contains all the observations 
with the largest values of sales. It can be observed that all three measures of premium decrease 
as the target business size increases. Hence, buyers pay a smaller percentage premium for bigger 
targets than for smaller ones. As expected EV and TIC increase with sales. This is logic since 
big businesses usually need a big amount of resources and have a higher value.  The same 
increasing trend is visible for EBITDA margin. However, class 4 shows a slight stabilization of 
the margin which precedes a decrease of 14.26% in class 5 . As result, the sample data analysis 
                                                 
12 Red figures indicate a negative percentage variation 
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show that middle businesses are the most profitable. The main explanatory variable for the 
purpose of our analysis, namely the pre-deal leverage expressed as equity to TIC ratio, shows 
an intense decrease. It means that as sales increase, hence businesses become bigger, companies 
use more debt to finance their operations. 
 
Table 7 - Descriptive Data: Medians of classes sorted by EQUITY to TIC 
 
Class 1  Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 
 (smallest)    (largest) 
Premium (E) %  34.03   29.54   27.38   27.90   30.86  
Δ%  -15.18% -7.90% 1.88% 9.59% 
Premium (EV) %  15.67   22.69   25.74   30.77   38.17  
Δ%  30.93% 11.85% 16.35% 19.38% 
Premium (TIC) %  14.46   20.00   22.74   26.68   30.72  
Δ%  27.72% 12.05% 14.77% 13.15% 
Sales (€ mln)  183.07   165.88   150.88   76.68   46.59  
Δ%  -10.36% -9.95% -96.77% -64.58% 
EV (€ mln)  162.73   193.96   180.06   80.11   47.34  
Δ%  16.10% -7.72% -124.77% -69.22% 
TIC (€ mln)  180.34   214.90   205.32   107.22   57.85  
Δ%  16.08% -4.66% -91.50% -85.34% 
EBITDA margin %  10.00   10.33   11.73   9.95   9.47  
Δ%  3.17% 11.96% -17.88% -5.10% 
Equity to TIC %  48.67   70.62   84.61   96.05   100.00  
Δ%  31.08% 16.54% 11.91% 3.95% 
Source: our calculations 
 
Table 7 uses as sorting criteria the equity to TIC ratio, the explanatory variable we are the most 
interested in. As the previous table, class 1 contains companies with the smallest values of 
equity to TIC ratio, so it is formed by the most leveraged targets. Whereas class 5 contains 
companies with the largest values of equity to TIC ratio, so it is formed by the least leveraged 
targets. Companies in class 1 have a leverage median of 48.67%, while companies in class 5 
have a leverage median of 100% (no-debt financing). 
The first thing to notice is the trend of premium(E). For the first three classes, which are related 
to a leverage decrease, corresponds a decrease of the percentage premium(E) as expected by 
theory. However, this trend is reversed in the last two classes. This change in trends was not 
expected from theory nor from the previous correlation matrix. With respect to premium(EV) 
and premium(TIC), both of them show a strong increase as long as leverage decrease. The 
variables EV and TIC slightly increase for the first two classes but they collapse in the last three 
classes for low leveraged targets. The only constant decreasing trend is shown by sales. 
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Given the not clear trends of table 7, in particular with respect to premium(E), we decided to 
deeply investigate the relationship between premium and leverage with a multivariate 
regression analysis controlling for several factors which can influence the premium. 
 
3.4.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
To better investigate the influence and magnitude of each explanatory variable on premium(E), 
and in particular the relationship between premium(E) and pre-deal leverage, we developed a 
multivariate regression analysis and table 8 shows the results of various regression models. 
 
Table 8 – Multivariate Regression Analysis with robust se 
Regression of Premium (E) 
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 
Constant 0.517 0.546 0.543 0.836  0.814 0.828 0.740 0.798 
t-statistic 15.35 16.09 16.07 11.12 6.42 6.46 5.51 9.46 
Loge(SALES) - 0.057 0.078 0.071 0.049 0.083 0.082 0.089 0.070 
t-statistic - 4.03 3.26 2.93 2.12 2.96 2.96 3.11 2.86 
Loge(EV)  - 0.151 - 0.136 - 0.133 - 0.166 - 0.160 - 0.163 - 0.159 
t-statistic  - 6.60 - 5.63 -5.57 - 5.96 - 5.76 - 5.58 - 6.08 
EBITDA 
margin 
  - 0.140 - 0.163  - 0.144 - 0.150 - 0.148 - 0.150 
t-statistic   - 2.41 - 2.75 - 2.28 - 2.38 - 2.36 -2.56 
EQUITY to 
TIC 
   - 0.317 - 0.354 - 0.352 - 0.348 - 0.332 
t-statistic    - 4.47  - 4.45 - 4.43 - 4.42 - 4.35 
Acquirer     0.099 0.097 0.097 0.095 
Dummy = strategic     4.20 4.14 4.01 4.16 
Cross Border     0.077 0.075 0.075 0.074 
Dummy = yes     3.60 3.50 3.50 3.43 
Attitude     YES YES YES  
Dummy         
Industry     YES YES YES  
Dummy         
Sub-regions     YES YES YES  
Dummy         
Time-Crisis      - 0.066  - 0.075 
Dummy = before      - 3.06  - 3.45 
Year       YES  
Dummy         
         
BIC 1136 1091 1090 1056 1044 1041 1122  990 
Source: our calculations 
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We started adding Loge(Sales), Loge(EV) and EBITDA margin sequentially in the first three 
regressions. In the 4th regression, the equity to TIC variable is finally added. It is important to 
say that we decide to use the natural logarithm of sales and EV because of the scale of these 
variables which was millions of euro. Furthermore, we inserted only the enterprise value and 
not the TIC because of multicollinearity. The choice of EV was based on two reasons: the first 
one is that EV should be more representative of the stand-alone value of the target and the 
second is that after various statistical attempts EV better fits the regression models. 
Since the very first regression, we performed for each one the test for heteroskedasticity. The 
test results confirmed the presence of heteroskedastic errors, then we applied the robust option 
in the statistical software and computed the robust standard errors to get reliable significance t-
statistics. 
As we can see from the table, the coefficient of loge(Sales) shows in the first model a negative 
relation, but adding the other independent variables it changes sign and the coefficient becomes 
positive, which is in contrast with the results of the correlation matrix and table 6. Hence, more 
complete regressions suggest that, bigger businesses receive slightly higher premiums(E) 
everything else constant. However, loge(EV), EBITDA margin and equity to TIC confirm the 
negative relation with the dependent variable as was found by the correlation analysis but not 
clearly visible in table 7. Regression 5 integrates the previous models with the explanatory 
categorical variables specified as dummies. Not relevant changes were seen in the previous 
coefficients and all of them remain statistically significant. The 6th and 7th regressions were 
simply a comparison to decide how to insert the time dummies variables. The division of 
observations in before and after financial crisis was a better variable to complete the model and 
we preferred it. 
The 6th regression resulted to be the most complete model and correctly specified. The equation 
of this complete model is the following: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸) =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ log𝑒𝑒(𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸) + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ log𝑒𝑒(𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉) + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶  
+ 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 +  𝛽𝛽6 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽7 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑉𝑉_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘 
+𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿_𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀 
 
Although the 6th model was the most complete and it uses all the variables we extracted from 
the database, applying the bayesian information criterion (BIC) we found a value of 1041. To 
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find a model with a better specification level, we built the 8th regression which have a BIC of 
990, the smallest value of BIC among our models. We preferred using BIC as a comparison 
index because of the presence of heteroskedasticity which did not allow the use of the adj-R2. 
The equation of the 8th model is the following: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸) =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ log𝑒𝑒(𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸) + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ log𝑒𝑒(𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉) + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 
+ 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 +  𝛽𝛽6 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽7 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑉𝑉_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 +  𝜀𝜀 
 
Although model 6th and 8th substantially differ in variables contained, the results found are quite 
the same. All the coefficients are statistically significant in both models, showing the same 
relationships and the same magnitude of marginal effects among the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables. This result was expected by previous analyses with the only exception 
of sales effects. 
It worth noting that the acquirer dummy is positive related with premium(E), meaning that 
strategic acquires pay a higher percentage premium with respect to financial buyers. This is to 
be expected by theory (Malenko & Gorbenko, 2014). Another result, which coincides with the 
empirical analysis of Dombret et al. (2008), is the positive effect of a cross border transaction 
on the premium(E). The coefficient suggests that foreign buyers pay higher premiums with 
respect to buyers within the same country. Moreover, being the coefficient of time-crisis 
variable negative, we can conclude that, on average, transactions happened before the financial 
crisis registered a lower premium(E). 
However, for the purpose of our study, the most important result is the negative strong influence 
of the equity to TIC ratio toward premium(E). Hence, the greater the pre-deal leverage of the 
target the higher the premium(E). Therefore, the acquisition premium expressed as a percentage 
based on pre-deal equity value suffers an overestimation effect caused by per-deal leverage of 
the target company. Our result coincides with the results of Covrig et al. which validate our first 
hypothesis. 
 
3.6 Analyses of Premium(TIC) and Premium(EV) 
Once the relationship between pre-deal leverage and premium(E) has been verified, we analysed 
the representation suggested by the APB. They suggest to express the premium based on total 
invested capital of the target company. As a further attempt to better express the premium, we 
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conducted also the same analysis on the premium expressed in relation with the enterprise 
value. 
We essentially obtained the exact same measures that Covrig et al. compute through the use of 
their first adjustment method, namely the de-levering and re-levering method. Specifically, we 
obtained the measures of premium after the first de-levering phase of method 113. 
From the theoretical framework, our expectation is to find that as the pre-deal leverage of the 
target company change, this would not significantly influence the dimension of premium(TIC) or 
the premium(EV). Hence, the marginal effect of the equity to TIC on these representations of 
premium variable should be close to zero.  
The previous correlation matrix shows that both these alternative measures are strongly 
positively correlated with equity to TIC at the aggregate sample level. Even the analysis 
performed by table 6 shows the same results. In fact, median values of premium(TIC) and 
premium(EV) rise substantially as long as the equity to TIC increase.  
After these rough results, we applied the 8th regression model used to investigate premium(E). 
This regression analysis allows to clean from influences of other factors the alternative 
measures of premium. Given the presence of heteroscedastic errors we compute as in previous 
regressions the robust standard errors to obtain meaningful t-statistics. Table 9 shows the 
results. 
 
Table 9 – Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 Regression of Premium(TIC) Regression of Premium(EV) 
 coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 0.191 4.81 0.324 4.07 
Loge(SALES) 0.047  2.41 0.242 4.13 
Loge(EV) - 0.114 - 5.59 - 0.399 - 5.49 
EBITDA margin - 0.119 - 2.23 - 0.144 - 1.43 
EQUITY to TIC 0.266 8.45 0.450 7.65 
Acquirer 0.083 5.54 0.115 4.00 
Cross Border 0.047 3.09 0.082 2.98 
Time-Crisis - 0.057 - 3.55 - 0.109 - 3.74 
     
BIC 294  1885  
Source: our calculations 
 
                                                 
13 See sub-paragraph 2.4.1 
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All the coefficients are statistically significant, with the only exception of EBITDA margin for 
premium(EV). Looking at the coefficients of equity to TIC for both regressions we see a strong 
positive relationship. It means that these alternative ways of measuring premium vary 
substantially as long as the leverage increase or decrease, other things equal. Hence, they are 
not uncorrelated with pre-deal leverage of target companies. 
We empirically proved that this simple proportional way of adjusting the premium for leverage 
has an important shortcoming as suggested by a theoretical example provided by Covrig et al.. 
Simply expressing premiums based on pre-deal values of TIC or EV systematically generates 
percentage premium values, which are related with the pre-deal leverage. As suggested by 
literature this is due to an excess of sensitivity of the computation method based on changes in 
leverage and which does not take into account the other factors. 
 
3.7 Summary of Results 
From our empirical analysis, we proved the existence of the relationship between premium(E) 
and the pre-deal leverage of the target company in the EU market. This allow us to accept our 
first hypothesis, namely the existence of an overestimation effect due to the way by which 
acquisition premiums are usually expressed by professionals and academics. Hence, our results 
confirm the intuition of Meinhart and it is coherent with the results found by Covrig et al. in 
their study on US market. 
Another important result of our empirical analysis is the rejection of the second hypothesis. In 
particular, neither premium(TIC) nor premium(EV) resulted to be uncorrelated to the pre-deal 
leverage of the target. Both of them show a strong negative relationship with leverage. It means 
that as long as leverage increase these percentage measures of premium decrease. This effect 
suggests an underestimation effect due to these alternative ways of expressing the acquisition 
premiums. 
It worth noting that side results of our study confirm well known academic researches on 
acquisition premium. In particular, our results confirm that strategic acquirers pay higher 
premiums with respect to financial buyer, cross border transactions register higher premiums 
with respect to domestic transactions and that after the financial crisis of 2008 premiums are 
higher. 
An important remark should be made about possible improvements on our study. One of the 
most crucial step of our empirical analysis is the selection of premium(E). As we have seen in 
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the previous chapter 2 there are different ways to compute this important measure from a time 
frame point of view. In our study, we applied a fixed time frame of 30 days before the 
announcement of the transaction as S&P Capital IQ and other studies suggested. However, the 
use of the FactSet Mergerstat®/BVR Control Premium Study could significantly enhance the 
reliability of premiums. This database has the advantage of carefully analyse each transaction 
and select the appropriate pre-deal equity value not influenced by the leakage effect. While in 





THE CALIBRATION METHOD IN THE EU MARKET  
4.1 Introduction 
As already said in chapter 3, the premium paid by the acquirer is a relevant part of the total 
consideration paid. This premium has the aim of pushing the current owner to sell its shares. 
In business valuation practice, the comparable transaction method is one of the most common 
way to understand which should be the monetary amount of premium to pay for the target 
company. This method is composed by two steps. In the first step, a set of comparable 
transactions is selected following different criteria like size, industry and profitability of target 
companies. The percentage acquisition premium paid by acquirers is computed for each 
transaction. The first step ends with the computation of the average premium(E) of these 
acquisition premiums. In the second step, this average value is multiplied by the stand-alone 
value of target equity, so obtaining the monetary amount of value which should be paid as 
acquisition premium. 
Given the results of our study, this method has an important shortfall. The use of premium(E) to 
compute the average premium may not be correct. In case of comparable transactions which 
involve targets with different levels of pre-deal leverage the use premium(E) may cause 
distortions in the computation of the monetary amount of premium (Covrig, et al., 2016). 
To fix this shortfall, Covrig et al. suggests two methods to adjust the acquisition premium 
observed in comparable transactions. The first one is a simple proportional method. It simply 
substitutes the denominator of premium(E) with the TIC value or EV value. However, given the 
results of empirical analyses on premium(TIC) and premium(EV), we conclude that the first method 
tends to understate the acquisition premium and probably generate a too wide range of average 
values to be used in the second step of the process.  
Because of these flaws, they developed the second method, which we referred as “Calibration 
method”. This second method uses market data and modified versions of de-levering and re-
levering formulas. In the next sections, we tried to adapt this method for Eurozone, so we 
replicated the calibration process to extract an adjustment factor from the EU market data and 
applied it to modified formulas. As last point, we built a re-levering sensitivity matrix which 
may be a useful tool for business analysts. This matrix contains measures of re-levered 
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premium(E) depending on average de-levered premium(TIC) of comparables and pre-deal 
leverage of target company. 
 
4.2 Computation of the Adjustment Factor 
The second adjustment method takes advantage of the two de-levering and re-levering formulas 















As was shown in the previous chapter, expressing acquisition premiums based on the TIC or 
EV value of target company understate the values of percentage premiums. Hence, these 
formulas systematically overstate the effect of leverage on the computation of premium(TIC) 
reducing their values.  
The equity to TIC ratio represents pre-deal leverage in the two formulas. From a mathematical 
point of view, the equity to TIC ratio can vary from 0 to 1. An equity to TIC ratio equal to 0 
represents a situation in which the company is completely financed by debt. An equity to TIC 
equal to 1 represents a situation in which the company is completely finance by shareholder 
funds. Considering the way by which formulas are built, premium(TIC) is always lower than 
premium(E) by the effect of the leverage factor. 
To reduce the effect of pre-deal leverage we modify the influence of equitytoTIC component 
in the formulas. The solution adopted is to lower the influence of equity to TIC ratio through 
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To obtain the result of decreasing the effect of equity to TIC ratio component, the adjustment 
factor has to assume values comprised between 0 and 1. We then substitute this expression into 
the previous formulas, obtaining two modified versions of the de-levering and re-levering 
formulas. 
 
Modified De-levering formula with the adjustment factor 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) = 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸) × �1 − �100% −  
𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 �
× 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶� 
 
Modified Re-levering formula with the adjustment factor 
𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸) =
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇)
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Once the formulas are built, we extract the adjustment factor using the calibration process. The 
first step of this process is to select the appropriate regression model to compute the expected 
premium(E) under different leverage conditions and using average values of the previous 
sample. We decided to use a slightly different version of the 4th regression model of previous 
chapter. The model is below illustrated. 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸) =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ log𝑒𝑒(𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸) + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ log𝑒𝑒(𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉) + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 
+𝛽𝛽7 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑉𝑉_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 +  𝜀𝜀 
 
We decide to use all the statistically significant continues variables and the time_crisis dummy, 
because of the will of computing an adjustment factor from transactions which occurred after 
the financial crisis. Too far transactions could be misleading since their acquisition premiums 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































After the estimation of the regression coefficients, we computed different expected premiums(E) 
as long as the pre-deal leverage variable varies and keeping fixed the other variables at average 
values of the sample. 
At this point, to compute the adjustment factor we applied the de-levering formula for each 
dimension of leverage. We fixed a random adjustment factor and we computed for each 
equation the distance among premium obtained and the premium(E) with equity to TIC equal to 
100% (unlevered company). Finally, we chose the adjustment factor which minimizes the 
square distances between obtained premiums and the unlevered premium(E).  
Given EU market data and an expected premium(E) equal to 31.15% at a 100% of equity to TIC 
we derived an adjustment factor which minimizes the square distances of 0.57. Table 10 reports 
all data relative to calibration and the two methods applied. 
To better explain the effects of applying the two different methods, we graphically illustrate the 















Premium(E) Premium(E) - No debt Premium(TIC) - 1° method Premium(TIC) - 2° method
Table 11 – Acquisition Premiums 
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The above table reports the outcomes of the forecasting process using the regression model, de-
levered premium(TIC) using the 1° method and de-levered premium(TIC) using the 2° method with 
EU market data. On the horizontal axis, we have the equity to TIC independent variable varying 
from 100% (no debt financing) to 0% (full debt financing). While on the vertical axis are shown 
the values of premiums as dependent variables. The red line is the benchmark of reference at a 
value of 31.75%. 
The blue line represents all the expected premiums(E) obtained by the regression model. We 
notice the increasing trend of the expected premium(E) given the increase of leverage.  
The yellow line and the green line are respectively the application of 1° method and 2° method. 
In particular, the yellow line show premiums(TIC) computed using the simple de-levering 
formula. A clear decreasing trend is visible. This is the underestimation effect previously shown 
from our statistical analysis. Another flaw of the first method is the wide range of premium(TIC). 
In fact, it varies from 31.75 at 100% Equity to TIC to a 11.24% at 20% of Equity to TIC. 
The green line show premiums(TIC) computed using the modified de-levering formula with an 
adjustment factor of 0.57. It first increases until 60% of equity to TIC and after it decreases. 
This second method has the advantage that values generated are around the expected premium(E) 
of an unlevered company (red line). This is an advantage given the hypothesis that pre-deal 
leverage must not influence the premium. Moreover, this method generates a narrower range 
of premiums(TIC). It varies from 33.71% at 60% of equity to TIC to 30.57% at 20% of equity to 
TIC. 
Another important point to highlight is that the adjustment factor computed for US market is 
equal to 0.50 and the adjustment factor for EU market equal to 0.57. A higher adjustment factor 
means that the influence of leverage is lower. Further, we have to remark that their adjustment 
factor was computed starting from data which include older transactions from 2003 to 2013, 
while our regression excludes transactions which occurred before the financial crisis. 
 
4.3 Sensitivity Matrix 
Once the average value of premiums(TIC) have been computed, the second step of the process 
implies that this percentage value is multiplied by the target equitytoTIC ratio. This operation 
gives as outcome the re-levered percentage premium(E), which can be finally used to compute 
the monetary amount of the acquisition premium. This quantity will be added to the target stand-
alone value and give an idea of the possible consideration which should be paid. 
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Table 12 – Sensitivity Matrix 
  Target EQUITYtoTIC value (%) 





















) 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 
5.0 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 
7.5 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 10 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 14 15 15 16 
10.0 10 10 11 11 11 12 12 12 13 13 14 15 15 16 17 17 18 19 21 22 
12.5 13 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 26 27 
15.0 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 19 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 28 29 31 33 
17.5 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 22 23 24 24 25 27 28 29 31 32 34 36 38 
20.0 20 21 21 22 23 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 32 33 35 37 39 41 44 
22.5 23 23 24 25 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 33 34 36 37 39 41 44 46 49 
25.0 25 26 27 27 28 29 30 31 32 34 35 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 51 55 
27.5 28 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 36 37 38 40 42 44 46 48 51 53 56 60 
30.0 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 39 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 55 58 62 65 
32.5 33 33 34 36 37 38 39 41 42 44 45 47 49 52 54 57 60 63 67 71 
35.0 35 36 37 38 40 41 42 44 45 47 49 51 53 56 58 61 64 68 72 76 
37.5 38 39 40 41 42 44 45 47 49 50 52 55 57 60 62 66 69 73 77 82 
40.0 40 41 42 44 45 47 48 50 52 54 56 58 61 64 67 70 74 78 82 87 
42.5 43 44 45 46 48 50 51 53 55 57 59 62 65 68 71 74 78 82 87 93 
45.0 45 46 48 49 51 52 54 56 58 61 63 66 68 71 75 79 83 87 92 98 
47.5 48 49 50 52 54 55 57 59 62 64 66 69 72 75 79 83 87 92 98 104 
50.0 50 51 53 55 56 58 60 62 65 67 70 73 76 79 83 87 92 97 103 109 
60.0 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 75 78 81 84 87 91 95 100 105 110 116 123 131 
70.0 70 72 74 77 79 82 84 87 91 94 98 102 106 111 116 122 129 136 144 153 
80.0 80 82 85 87 90 93 97 100 104 108 112 117 122 127 133 140 147 155 164 174 
90.0 90 93 95 98 102 105 109 112 117 121 126 131 137 143 150 157 165 175 185 196 
100 100 103 106 109 113 117 121 125 130 134 140 146 152 159 166 175 184 194 205 218 
125 125 129 133 137 141 146 151 156 162 168 175 182 190 199 208 218 230 242 257 273 
150 150 154 159 164 169 175 181 187 194 202 210 218 228 238 250 262 276 291 308 327 
175 175 180 186 191 198 204 211 219 227 235 245 255 266 278 291 306 322 339 359 382 
200 200 206 212 219 226 233 241 250 259 269 280 291 304 318 333 349 368 388 411 436 
Source: our elaboration 
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Table 12 illustrates a sensitivity matrix of the modified re-levering step. On the first left column, 
the average possible values of comparables premium(TIC) are listed in ascending order; while on 
the first row, the possible target equity to TIC values are listed from a no debt value (100) to a 
highly debt value (5). The values inside the matrix are all the possible combinations of re-
levered premium(E) using the modified formula with the EU adjustment factor of 0.57. 
This can be a useful reasoning tool for analysts who wants to figure out the influence of these 
two components on the outcome. First of all, keeping fixed the target equity to TIC ratio, we 
see that the increase of re-levered premium(E) is proportional to the increase of average 
comparables premium(TIC). Whereas, keeping fixed the average comparables premium(TIC) we 
see that premium(E) has an exponential trend. 
The re-levering step is fundamental to complete the process and correctly represent the target 
premium(E). Hence, the whole calibration method allows analyst to computed target premium(E) 





The theoretical framework is exhaustive and specific. The common way of expressing the 
acquisition premium overstates its measure because of a computational bias. Hence, using this 
traditional representation does not allow an effective comparison among transactions which 
shows different target capital structures. 
Despite the possible improvements, the empirical analysis performed proved the existence of 
the relationship between pre-deal leverage and the acquisition premium expressed as percentage 
based on the equity value. Our results support the intuition of Meinhart, validate the conclusion 
of the Appraisal Practice Board and confirm the results of Covrig et al. 
Alternative ways of expressing premium resulted to be inappropriate since they are related with 
the target capital structure. However, the calibration method adapted to the EU M&A market 
seems to be a suitable tool to adjust past acquisition premiums for the purpose of business 
valuation.  
All these conclusions are useful insights for academics and professionals of M&A market which 
could allow them to improve their valuations and remove a systemic bias in figuring out the 
possible acquisition premium that should be paid. We want to remark that the final price paid 
in an M&A transaction is always the result of an intense process and influenced by bargaining 
power of different counterparties.  
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